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Abstract
Many models proposed to study the evolution of collective action rely on a formalism that
represents social interactions as n-player games between individuals adopting discrete actions such
as cooperate and defect. Despite the importance of spatial structure in biological collective action,
the analysis of n-player games games in spatially structured populations has so far proved elusive.
We address this problem by considering mixed strategies and by integrating discrete-action n-player
games into the direct fitness approach of social evolution theory. This allows to conveniently identify
convergence stable strategies and to capture the effect of population structure by a single structure
coefficient, namely, the pairwise (scaled) relatedness among interacting individuals. As an application,
we use our mathematical framework to investigate collective action problems associated with the
provision of three different kinds of collective goods, paradigmatic of a vast array of helping traits in
nature: “public goods” (both providers and shirkers can use the good, e.g., alarm calls), “club goods”
(only providers can use the good, e.g., participation in collective hunting), and “charity goods” (only
shirkers can use the good, e.g., altruistic sacrifice). We show that relatedness promotes the evolution
of collective action in different ways depending on the kind of collective good and its economies of
scale. Our findings highlight the importance of explicitly accounting for relatedness, the kind of
collective good, and the economies of scale in theoretical and empirical studies of the evolution of
collective action.
Keywords. n-player games; games between relatives; relatedness; inclusive fitness
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1 Introduction1
Collective action occurs when individuals work together to provide a collective good (Olson, 1971).2
Examples abound in the social and natural sciences: humans collectively build houses, roads, walls, and3
mobilize armies to make war; bacteria secrete enzymes that benefit other bacteria; sterile ant workers4
build the nest and raise the brood of the queen; lions work together to catch large game. Yet cooperation5
of this kind poses a collective action problem: if individual effort is costly there is an incentive to reduce or6
withdraw one’s effort, but if enough individuals follow this logic the collective good will not be provided.7
Much research in the social sciences has identified mechanisms for solving collective action problems,8
including privatization and property rights, reciprocity in repeated interactions, and institutions (Hardin,9
1982; Sugden, 1986; Taylor, 1987; Ostrom, 2003). The principles behind these mechanisms have also been10
explored in evolutionary biology (Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Nunn and Lewis, 2001; Strassmann and11
Queller, 2014) where it has been further emphasized that individual effort in cooperation should also12
increase as the relatedness between interactants increases (Hamilton, 1964). As social interactions often13
occur between relatives (because of spatial structure, kin recognition, or both; Rousset 2004; Bourke14
2011) it is thought that relatedness plays a central role for solving collective action problems in biology.15
In particular, relatedness has been identified as the main mechanism of conflict resolution in the fraternal16
major transitions in evolution, i.e., those resulting from associations of relatives, such as the transitions17
from unicellularity to multicellularity, or from autarky to eusociality (Queller, 2000).18
Mathematical models of collective action in spatially structured populations or between relatives often19
assume that strategies are defined in a continuous action space, such as effort invested into the provision20
of a public good or level of restrain in resource exploitation (Frank, 1995; Foster, 2004; Lehmann, 2008;21
Frank, 2010; Cornforth et al., 2012). This allows for a straightforward application of the direct fitness22
method (Taylor and Frank, 1996; Rousset, 2004) to investigate the effects of relatedness on the evolution23
of collective action. Contrastingly, many evolutionary models of collective action between unrelated24
individuals (Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Dugatkin, 1990; Motro, 1991; Bach et al., 2006; Hauert et al.,25
2006; Pacheco et al., 2009; Archetti and Scheuring, 2011; Sasaki and Uchida, 2014) represent interactions26
as n-player games in discrete action spaces (e.g., individuals play either “cooperate” or “defect”). These27
models can be mathematically involved, as identifying polymorphic equilibria might require solving28
polynomial equations of degree n− 1, for which there are no general analytical solutions if n ≥ 6.29
Here we integrate two-action n-player mixed strategy game-theoretic models into the direct fitness30
method of social evolution theory (Taylor and Frank, 1996; Rousset, 2004), which allows for studying the31
effect of spatial structure on convergence stability by using pairwise relatedness. Several shape-preserving32
properties of polynomials in Bernstein form (Farouki, 2012) then allow us to characterize convergence33
stable strategies with a minimum of mathematical effort. Our framework delivers tractable formulas34
for games between relatives which differ from the corresponding formulas for games between unrelated35
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individuals only in that “inclusive payoffs” (the payoff to self plus relatedness times the sum of payoffs36
to others) rather than solely standard payoffs must be taken into account. For a large class of games,37
convergence stable strategies can then be identified by a straightforward adaptation of existing results for38
games between unrelated individuals (Pen˜a et al., 2014).39
As an application of our modeling framework, we study the effects of relatedness on the evolution of40
collective action under different assumptions on the kind of collective good and its economies of scale,41
thus covering a wide array of biologically meaningful situations. To this aim, we distinguish between three42
kinds of collective goods: (i) “public goods” where all individuals in the group can use the good, e.g.,43
alarm calls in vertebrates (Searcy and Nowicki, 2005) and the secretion of diffusible beneficial compounds44
in bacteria (Griffin et al., 2004; Gore et al., 2009; Cordero et al., 2012); (ii) “club goods” where only45
providers can use the good (Sandler and Tschirhart, 1997), e.g., cooperative hunting (Packer and Ruttan,46
1988) where the benefits of a successful hunt go to individuals joining collective action but not to solitary47
individuals; and (iii) “charity goods” where only nonproviders can use the good, e.g., eusociality in48
Hymenoptera (Bourke and Franks, 1995) where sterile workers provide a good benefiting only queens.49
For all three kinds of goods, we consider three classes of production functions giving the amount50
of good created as a function of the total level of effort and hence describing the associated economies51
of scale: (i) linear (constant returns to scale), (ii) decelerating (diminishing returns to scale), and52
(iii) accelerating (increasing returns to scale). Although linear production functions are often assumed53
because of mathematical simplicity, collective goods are often characterized by either decelerating or54
accelerating functions, so that the net effect of several individuals behaving socially is more or less55
than the sum of individual effects. In other words, social interactions can be characterized by (either56
positive or negative) synergy. For instance, enzyme production in microbial collective action is likely to57
be nonlinear, as in the cases of invertase hydrolyzing disaccharides into glucose in the budding yeast58
Saccharomyces cerevisiae (Gore et al., 2009) or virulence factors triggering gut inflammation in the59
pathogen Salmonella typhimurium (Ackermann et al., 2008). In the former case, the relationship between60
growth rate and glucose concentration in yeast has been reported to be decelerating, i.e., invertase61
production has diminishing returns to scale (Gore et al., 2009, Fig. 3.c); in the latter case, the relationship62
between the level of expression of virulence factors and inflammation intensity appears to be accelerating,63
i.e., it exhibits increasing returns to scale (Ackermann et al., 2008, Fig. 2.d).64
We show that the effect of relatedness on the provision of collective goods, although always positive,65
critically depends on the kind of good (public, club, or charity) and on its economies of scale (linear,66
decelerating or accelerating production functions). Moreover, we show that relatedness and economies of67
scale can interact in nontrivial ways, leading to patterns of frequency dependence and dynamical portraits68
that cannot arise when considering any of these two factors in isolation. We discuss the predictions of our69
models, their implications for empirical and theoretical work, and their connections with the broader70
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literature on the evolution of helping.71
2 Model72
2.1 Population structure73
We consider a homogeneous group-structured population with a finite number of groups each containing74
an identical number of haploid individuals. Spatial structure may follow a variety of schemes, including75
the island model of dispersal (Wright, 1931), the isolation-by-distance model (Male´cot, 1975), the haystack76
model (Maynard Smith, 1964), models where groups split into daughter groups and compete against each77
other (Gardner and West, 2006; Traulsen and Nowak, 2006; Lehmann et al., 2007b), and evolutionary78
graphs (Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2007; Lehmann et al., 2007a). We leave particular details of79
the life history (e.g., whether generations are overlapping or non-overlapping) and population structure80
(e.g., the dispersal distribution) unspecified as they do not affect our analysis. All that is required is81
that the “selection gradient” can be written in a form proportional to (4) below. For this, we refer the82
interested reader to Rousset (2004); Lehmann and Rousset (2010); Van Cleve (2015).83
2.2 Social interactions84
Within groups, individuals participate in an n-player game with two available actions: A (e.g., “cooper-85
ation”) and B (e.g., “defection”). We denote by ak the payoff to an A-player when k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 186
co-players choose A (and hence n− 1− k co-players choose B). Likewise, we denote by bk the payoff to a87
B-player when k co-players choose A. These payoffs can be represented as a table of the form:88
Opposing A-players 0 1 . . . k . . . n− 1
payoff to A a0 a1 . . . ak . . . an−1
payoff to B b0 b1 . . . bk . . . bn−1
.89
Individuals implement mixed strategies, i.e., they play A with probability z (and B with probability90
1− z). The set of available strategies is then the interval [0, 1]. At any given time only two strategies are91
present in the population: z and z + δ. Denoting by z• the strategy of a focal individual and by z`(•) the92
strategy of its `-th co-player, the expected payoff pi to the focal can be written as93
pi
(
z•, z1(•), z2(•), ..., zn−1(•)
)
=
n−1∑
k=0
φk
(
z1(•), z2(•), . . . , zn−1(•)
)
[z•ak + (1− z•)bk] , (1)94
where φk is the probability that exactly k co-players play action A. A first-order Taylor-series expansion95
about the average strategy z◦ =
∑n−1
`=1 z`(•)/(n − 1) of co-players shows that, to first order in δ, the96
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probability φk is given by a binomial distribution with parameters n− 1 and z◦, i.e.,97
φk
(
z1(•), z2(•), . . . , zn−1(•)
)
=
(
n− 1
k
)
zk◦ (1− z◦)n−1−k +O(δ2). (2)98
Substituting (2) into (1) and discarding second and higher order terms, we obtain99
pi (z•, z◦) =
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
zk◦ (1− z◦)n−1−k [z•ak + (1− z•)bk] (3)100
for the payoff of a focal individual as a function of the focal’s strategy z• and the average strategy z◦ of101
co-players.102
2.3 Evolutionary dynamics, scaled relatedness, and Hamilton’s rule103
We are interested in the long-term evolutionary attractors of the probability z of playing A. To derive104
them, we consider a population of residents playing z in which a single mutant playing z + δ appears105
due to mutation, and denote by ρ(δ, z) the fixation probability of the mutant. We take the phenotypic106
selection gradient S(z) = (dρ/dδ)δ=0 as measure of evolutionary success (Rousset and Billiard 2000, p.107
819; Van Cleve 2015, Section 2.5); indeed, S(z) > 0 entails that the fixation probability of the mutant108
is greater than that of a neutral mutant under so-called “δ-weak” selection (Wild and Traulsen, 2007).109
Letting the expected relative fecundity of an adult be equal to its expected payoff (i.e., the payoffs from110
the game have fecundity effects; Taylor and Irwin 2000), the selection gradient S(z) can be shown to be111
proportional to what we call in this paper the “gain function”112
G(z) = ∂pi(z•, z◦)
∂z•
∣∣∣∣∣
z•=z◦=z︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect, −C(z)
+κ
∂pi(z•, z◦)
∂z◦
∣∣∣∣∣
z•=z◦=z︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect, B(z)
= −C(z) + κB(z) (4)113
(for a derivation, see e.g., Van Cleve and Lehmann 2013, Eq. 7, or Van Cleve 2015, Eq. 73).114
The gain function G(z) is determined by three components. First, the direct effect −C(z) describing115
the change in expected payoff resulting from the focal infinitesimally changing its own strategy. Second,116
the indirect effect B(z) describing the change in expected payoff of the focal resulting from the focal’s117
co-players changing their strategy infinitesimally. Third, the indirect effect is weighted by the scaled118
relatedness coefficient κ, which is a measure of relatedness between the focal individual and its neighbors,119
demographically scaled so as to capture the effects of local competition on selection (Queller, 1994;120
Lehmann and Rousset, 2010).121
Scaled relatedness κ is a function of demographic parameters such as the migration rate, group size,122
and vital rates of individuals or groups, but is independent of the evolving trait z and the payoffs from123
the game. In general, κ can take a value between −1 and 1, depending on the demographic assumptions124
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(Lehmann and Rousset, 2010; Van Cleve and Lehmann, 2013). For instance, in a model where groups125
split into daughter groups and compete against each other (Traulsen and Nowak, 2006), scaled relatedness126
can be shown to be given by (Lehmann et al., 2007b)127
κ =
q − [2q/g +m/(ng)]
m(ng − 1)/(ng) + q(n+ g − 2)/g , (5)128
where g is the number of groups, n is group size, q is the splitting rate at which groups form propagules,129
and m is the migration rate (Van Cleve and Lehmann, 2013, Eq. B.4). Scaled relatedness coefficients have130
been evaluated for many spatially structured populations and demographic assumptions (see Lehmann131
and Rousset 2010; Van Cleve and Lehmann 2013 and references therein). In Appendix A we contribute132
to this literature by calculating values of scaled relatedness for several variants of the haystack model. In133
the subsequent analysis we treat κ as a parameter.134
The gain function (4) is sufficient to characterize convergence stable strategies (i.e., strategies towards135
which selection locally drives the population by successive allelic replacements; Christiansen 1991; Geritz136
et al. 1998) under a trait substitution dynamic (Rousset and Billiard, 2000; Rousset, 2004). In our context,137
candidate convergence stable strategies are either singular strategies (i.e., values z∗ for which G(z∗) = 0),138
or the two pure strategies z = 0 and z = 1. In particular, a singular strategy z∗ is convergence stable139
(or an attractor) if dG(z)/dz|z=z∗ < 0 and convergence unstable (or a repeller) if dG(z)/dz|z=z∗ > 0.140
Regarding the endpoints, z = 0 (resp. z = 1) is convergence stable if G(0) < 0 (resp. G(1) > 0).141
Finally, let us also note that the condition for a mutant to be favored by selection, −C + κB > 0, can142
be understood as a demographically scaled form of the marginal version of Hamilton’s rule (Lehmann143
and Rousset, 2010), with C corresponding to the marginal direct costs and B to the marginal indirect144
benefits of expressing an increased probability of playing action A. This scaled version of Hamilton’s rule145
partitions the selection gradient in fecundity effects and scaled relatedness, in contrast to the partition on146
fitness effects and genetic relatedness of the classical formalism (i.e., −c+ rb > 0, where c and b are the147
direct and indirect fitness effects, and r is relatedness). Social evolution theory classifies social behaviors148
as altruistic, cooperative (or mutually beneficial), selfish, and spiteful, according to the signs of direct149
fitness costs and benefits (Hamilton, 1964; Rousset, 2004; West et al., 2007). A similar classification of150
social behaviors can be done according to the behavior’s effect on the direct and indirect components of151
marginal payoff (or fecundity). In order to avoid ambiguities, we refer to the resulting social behaviors as152
“payoff altruistic” (C > 0 and B > 0), “payoff cooperative” (C < 0 and B > 0), “payoff selfish” (C < 0 and153
B < 0), and “payoff spiteful” (C > 0 and B < 0).154
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3 Games between relatives155
We start by deriving compact expressions for the direct effect −C(z), the indirect effect B(z), and the gain156
function G(z) in terms of the payoffs ak and bk of the game. These expressions provide the foundation for157
our subsequent analysis.158
Imagine a focal individual playing B in a group where k of its co-players play A. Suppose that the159
focal switches its action to A while co-players hold fixed their actions, thus changing its payoff from bk to160
ak. As a consequence, the focal experiences a “direct gain from switching” given by161
dk = ak − bk, k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1. (6)162
At the same time, each of the co-players playing A experiences a change in payoff given by ∆ak−1 =163
ak − ak−1 and each of the co-players playing B experiences a change in payoff given by ∆bk = bk+1 − bk.164
Taken as a block, co-players experience a change in payoff given by165
ek = k∆ak−1 + (n− 1− k)∆bk, k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1, (7)166
where we set a−1 = bn+1 = 0. From the focal’s perspective, this change in payoffs represents an “indirect167
gain from switching” to the focal if co-players are relatives. Adding up direct and indirect gains weighted168
by κ allows us to define the “inclusive gains from switching”169
fk = dk + κek, k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1, (8)170
in a group where k out of the n− 1 co-players play A.171
We show in Appendix B that the direct, indirect, and net effects appearing in (4) are indeed given by172
−C(z) =
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
zk(1− z)n−1−kdk, (9a)173
B(z) =
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
zk(1− z)n−1−kek, (9b)174
175
and176
G(z) =
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
zk(1− z)n−1−kfk, (10)177
that is, as the expected values of the relevant gains from switching when the number of co-players playing178
A is distributed according to a binomial distribution with parameters n− 1 and z.179
It follows from (10) that games between relatives are mathematically equivalent to transformed games180
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between unrelated individuals, where “inclusive payoffs” take the place of standard, or personal, payoffs.181
Indeed, consider a game in which A-players and B-players respectively obtain payoffs182
a′k = ak + κ [kak + (n− 1− k)bk+1] , (11a)183
b′k = bk + κ [kak−1 + (n− 1− k)bk] , (11b)184
185
when k co-players play A. Payoffs a′k and b
′
k can be understood as inclusive payoffs consisting of the payoff186
obtained by a focal plus κ times the sum of the payoffs obtained by the focal’s co-players. Using (6)–(7)187
we can rewrite (8) as fk = a
′
k − b′k, so that the inclusive gains from switching are identical to the direct188
gains from switching in a game with payoff structure given by (11).189
This observation has two relevant consequences. First, existing results on the evolutionarily stable190
strategies of games between unrelated individuals (Pen˜a et al., 2014), which are based on the observation191
that the right side of (10) is a polynomial in Bernstein form (Farouki, 2012), also apply here, provided192
that the inclusive gains from switching fk are used instead of the standard (direct) gains from switching dk193
in the formula for the gain function, and that evolutionary stability is understood as convergence stability.194
For a large class of games, these results allow us to identify convergence stable strategies from a direct195
inspection of the sign pattern of the inclusive gains from switching fk. Second, we can interpret the effect196
of relatedness as inducing the payoff transformation ak → a′k, bk → b′k. For n = 2, such transformation is197
the classic result of two-player games between relatives (Hamilton, 1971; Grafen, 1979; Day and Taylor,198
1998)199
 a′0 a′1
b′0 b
′
1
 =
 a0 + κb1 (1 + κ)a1
(1 + κ)b0 b1 + κa0
 ,200
where the payoff of the focal is augmented by adding κ times the payoff of the co-player.201
4 The evolution of collective action202
Let us now apply our model to the evolution of collective action. To this end, we let action A (“provide”)203
be associated with some effort in collective action, action B (“shirk”) with no effort, and refer to A-players204
as “providers” and to B-players as “shirkers”. Each provider incurs a cost γ > 0 in order for a collective205
good of value βj to be created, where j is the total number of providers. We assume that the collective206
good fails to be created if no individual works (β0 = 0), and that the value of the collective good βj is207
increasing in the number of providers (∆βj = βj+1 − βj ≥ 0). We distinguish between three kinds of208
collective goods, depending on which individuals have access to the good: (i) “public goods”, (ii) “club209
goods”, and (iii) “charity goods”. Fig. 1 illustrates these three kinds of collective goods and Table 1210
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provides the corresponding payoffs and gains from switching.211
Economies of scale are incorporated in the model through the properties of the production function212
βj . We investigate three functional forms (Fig. 2): (i) linear (βj = βj for some β > 0, so that ∆βj is213
constant), (ii) decelerating (∆βj is decreasing in j), and (iii) accelerating (∆βj is increasing in j). We also214
say that returns to scale are respectively (i) constant, (ii) diminishing, or (iii) increasing. To illustrate215
the effects of economies of scale, we consider the “geometric production function”:216
βj = β
j−1∑
`=0
λ`, (12)217
with β > 0 and λ > 0, for which returns to scale are constant when λ = 1, decreasing when λ < 1, and218
increasing when λ > 1 (Fig. 2).219
For all three kinds of collective goods, the indirect gains from switching are always nonnegative, hence220
the indirect effect B(z) is nonnegative for all z. Consequently, participation in collective action is either221
payoff altruistic or payoff cooperative, and the selection gradient is increasing in κ. The provision of222
each kind of collective good however leads to a different collective action problem, as it is reflected in the223
different payoff structures of the corresponding games (Table 1). In particular, while the provision of224
charity goods is payoff altruistic for all z, the provision of public and club goods can be either payoff225
altruistic or payoff cooperative, depending on the parameters of the game and the resident strategy z.226
In the following, we characterize the evolutionary dynamics of each of these three kinds of collective227
action problems and investigate the effects of (scaled) relatedness on the set of evolutionary attractors.228
Although many of our results also extend to the case of negative relatedness, for simplicity we restrict229
attention to nonnegative relatedness (κ ≥ 0). It will be shown that the evolutionary dynamics fall230
into one of the following five dynamical regimes: (i) “null provision” (z = 0 is the only attractor), (ii)231
“full provision” (z = 1 is the only attractor), (iii) “coexistence” (there is a unique singular strategy z∗232
which is attracting), (iv) “bistability” (z = 0 and z = 1 are both attracting, with a singular repeller z∗233
dividing their basins of attraction), and (v) “bistable coexistence” (z = 0 is attracting, z = 1 is repelling,234
and there are two singular strategies zL and zR, satisfying zL < zR, such that zL is a repeller and zR235
is an attractor). Regimes (i)-(iv) are those classical from 2 × 2 games (Cressman, 2003, Section 2.2),236
while bistable coexistence can only arise for interactions with more than two players (indeed, bistable237
coexistence requires the polynomial G(z) to have two sign changes, which is only possible if n > 2; Broom238
et al. 1997; Gokhale and Traulsen 2014).239
4.1 Linear production functions240
To isolate the effects of the kind of collective good, we begin our analysis with the case where the241
production function takes the linear form βj = βj, i.e., λ = 1 in (12). For all three kinds of collective242
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goods, the gain function can then be written as243
G(z) = (n− 1) [−C + κB + (1 + κ)Dz] .244
The parameter C > 0 may be thought of as the “effective cost” per co-player of joining collective action245
alone. We have C = γ/(n − 1) when a focal provider is not among the beneficiaries of the collective246
good (charity goods) and C = (γ − β)/(n− 1) otherwise (public and club goods). The parameter B ≥ 0247
measures the incremental benefit accruing to each co-player of a focal provider when none of the co-players248
joins collective action. We thus have B = 0 for club goods and B = β otherwise. Finally, D is null for249
public goods (D = 0), positive for club goods (D = β), and negative for charity goods (D = −β).250
Depending on the values of these parameters, we obtain the following characterization of the resulting251
evolutionary dynamics:252
1. For public goods (D = 0) selection is frequency independent. There is null provision if −C+κB < 0,253
and full provision if −C + κB > 0.254
2. For club goods (D > 0) selection is positive frequency-dependent. There is null provision if255
−C+κB+(1+κ)D ≤ 0, and full provision if −C+κB ≥ 0. If −C+κB < 0 < −C+κB+(1+κ)D,256
there is bistability: both z = 0 and z = 1 are attractors and the singular strategy257
z∗ =
C − κB
(1 + κ)D
(13)258
is a repeller.259
3. For charity goods (D < 0), selection is negative frequency-dependent. There is null provision if260
−C+κB ≤ 0, and full provision if −C+κB+(1+κ)D ≥ 0. If −C+κB+(1+κ)D < 0 < −C+κB,261
there is coexistence: both z = 0 and z = 1 are repellers and the singular strategy z∗ is the only262
attractor.263
This analysis reveals three important points. First, in the absence of economies of scale the gain264
function is linear in z, which allows for a straightforward analysis of the evolutionary dynamics for all265
three kinds of collective action. Second, because of the linearity of the gain function, the evolutionary266
dynamics of such games fall into one of the four classical dynamical regimes arising from 2× 2 games.267
Third, which of these dynamical regimes arises is determined by relatedness and the kind of good in268
a simple way. For all kinds of collective action, there is null provision when relatedness is low. For269
public goods provision, high values of relatedness lead to full provision. For club and charity goods, high270
relatedness also promotes collective action, leading to either bistability (club goods) or to the coexistence271
of providers and shirkers.272
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4.2 Public goods with accelerating and decelerating production functions273
How do economies of scale change the evolutionary dynamics of public goods provision? Substituting the274
inclusive gains from switching given in Table 1 into (10) we obtain275
G(z) =
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
zk(1− z)n−1−k {−γ + [1 + κ(n− 1)] ∆βk} . (14)276
If the production function is decelerating, ∆βk is decreasing in k, implying that G(z) is decreasing in277
z (Pen˜a et al., 2014, Remark 3). Similarly, if the production function is accelerating, ∆βk is increasing278
in k, so that G(z) is increasing in z. In both cases the evolutionary dynamics are easily characterized279
by applying existing results for public goods games between unrelated individuals (Pen˜a et al., 2014,280
Section 4.3): with accelerating production functions, there is null provision if γ ≥ [1 + κ(n − 1)]∆β0,281
and full provision if γ ≤ [1 + κ(n− 1)]∆βn−1. If [1 + κ(n− 1)]∆βn−1 < γ < [1 + κ(n− 1)]∆β0, there is282
coexistence. With decelerating production functions, there is null provision if γ ≥ [1 + κ(n− 1)]∆βn−1,283
and full provision if γ ≤ [1 + κ(n − 1)]∆β0. If [1 + κ(n − 1)]∆β0 < γ < [1 + κ(n − 1)]∆βn−1, there is284
bistability.285
The effect of relatedness on the evolution of public goods provision can be better grasped by noting286
that multiplying and dividing (14) by 1 + κ(n− 1) we obtain287
G(z) = [1 + κ(n− 1)]
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
zk(1− z)n−1−k (−γ˜ + ∆βk) , (15)288
where γ˜ = γ/[1 + κ(n− 1)]. This is (up to multiplication by a positive constant) equivalent to the gain289
function of a public goods game with constant cost γ˜ between unrelated individuals, which has been290
analyzed under different assumptions on the shape of the production function βk (Motro, 1991; Bach291
et al., 2006; Hauert et al., 2006; Pacheco et al., 2009; Archetti and Scheuring, 2011; Pen˜a et al., 2014).292
Hence, the effects of relatedness can be understood as affecting only the cost of cooperation, while leaving293
economies of scale and patterns of frequency dependence unchanged.294
To illustrate the evolutionary dynamics of public goods games, consider a geometric production295
function (12) with λ 6= 1 (see Table 2 for a summary of the results and Appendix C for a derivation). We296
find that there are two critical cost-to-benefit ratios:297
ε = min
(
1 + κ(n− 1), λn−1[1 + κ(n− 1)]) and ϑ = max (1 + κ(n− 1), λn−1[1 + κ(n− 1)]) , (16)298
such that for small costs (γ/β ≤ ε) there is full provision and for large costs (γ/β ≥ ϑ) there is null299
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provision. For intermediate costs (ε < γ/β < ϑ), there is a singular strategy given by300
z∗ =
1
1− λ
[
1−
(
γ
β [1 + κ(n− 1)]
) 1
n−1
]
, (17)301
such that there is coexistence if returns to scale are diminishing (λ < 1) and bistability if returns to scale302
are increasing (λ > 1). For a given cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β, higher relatedness makes the region in the303
parameter space where cooperation (resp. defection) dominates larger (resp. smaller). Moreover, z∗ is an304
increasing (resp. decreasing) function of κ when λ < 1 (resp. λ > 1), meaning that the proportion of305
providers at the internal attractor (resp. the size of the basin of attraction of z = 1) is larger for higher κ306
(Fig. 3.a and 3.d).307
4.3 Club goods with accelerating and decelerating production functions308
For club goods the direct gains from switching dk (cf. Table 1) are increasing in k independently of309
any economies of scale. This implies that the direct effect −C(z) is positive frequency-dependent. If310
the production function is accelerating, the indirect gains from switching ek are also increasing in k,311
so that the indirect effect B(z) is also positive frequency-dependent. For κ ≥ 0 this ensures that, just312
as when economies of scale are absent, the gain function G(z) is positive frequency-dependent. Hence,313
the evolutionary dynamics are qualitatively identical to those arising from linear production functions:314
for low relatedness, there is null provision; for high relatedness, there is bistability (see Fig. 3.e for an315
illustration and Appendix D.1 for proofs).316
If the production function is decelerating, the indirect gains from switching ek may still be increasing317
in k because the incremental benefit ∆βk accrues to a larger number of recipients as k increases. In such318
a scenario, always applicable when n = 2, the evolutionary dynamics are again qualitatively identical319
to those arising when economies of scale are absent. A different picture emerges if the number of320
players is greater than two and returns to scale are diminishing. In this case, B(z) can be negative321
frequency-dependent for some z, and hence (for sufficiently high values of κ) so can be G(z). Depending322
on the value of relatedness, which modulates how the frequency dependence of B(z) interacts with that of323
C(z), and on the particular shape of the production function, this can give rise to evolutionary dynamics324
different from those discussed in Section 4.1. In particular, bistable coexistence is possible.325
As an example, consider the geometric production function (12) with λ 6= 1 (see Table 2 for a summary326
of results and Appendix D.2 for proofs). Defining the critical returns-to-scale value327
ξ =
κ(n− 2)
1 + κ(n− 1) , (18)328
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and the two critical cost-to-benefit ratios329
ς =
1− λn
1− λ + κ(n− 1)λ
n−1, and τ =
1
1− λ
[
1 + λκ
(
(n− 2)κ
1 + κ(n− 1)
)n−2]
, (19)330
which satisfy ξ < 1 and ς < τ , our result can be stated as follows. For λ ≥ ξ the evolutionary dynamics331
depends on how the cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β compares to 1 and to ς. If γ/β ≤ 1 (low costs), there is full332
provision, while if γ/β ≥ ς (high costs), there is null provision. If 1 < γ/β < ς (intermediate costs), there333
is bistability. For λ < ξ, the classification of possible evolutionary dynamics is as in the case λ ≥ ξ, except334
that, if ς < γ/β < τ , there is bistable coexistence, with z = 0 convergence stable, z = 1 convergence335
unstable, and two singular strategies zL (convergence unstable) and zR (convergence stable) satisfying336
0 < zL < zR < 1. Although we have not been able to obtain closed form expressions for the singular337
strategies (z∗ in the case of bistability; zL and zR in the case of bistable coexistence), numerical values of338
their locations can be obtained by searching for roots of G(z) in the interval (0, 1), as we illustrate in Fig.339
3.b and Fig. 3.e.340
The critical values ξ, ς, and τ are all increasing functions of κ ≥ 0. Hence, with larger relatedness κ,341
the regions of the parameter space where some level of collective action is convergence stable expand342
at the expense of the region of dominant nonprovision. Moreover, inside these regions the convergence343
stable positive probability of providing increases with κ (Fig. 3.b). When the production function is344
“sufficiently” decelerating (λ < ξ) and for intermediate cost-to-benefit ratios (ς < γ/β < τ), relatedness345
and economies of scale interact in a nontrivial way, leading to saddle-node bifurcations whereby two346
singular strategies appear as κ increases (Fig. 3.b).347
4.4 Charity goods with accelerating and decelerating production functions348
For charity goods the direct gains from switching dk (cf. Table 1) are always decreasing in k, so that the349
direct effect −C(z) is negative frequency-dependent.350
From the formulas given in Table 1, it is clear that the direct gains from switching dk are always351
decreasing in k. Hence, the direct effect −C(z) is negative frequency-dependent. If the production352
function is decelerating, the indirect gains from switching ek are also decreasing in k, implying that the353
indirect effect B(z) is also negative frequency-dependent and that the same is true for the gain function354
G(z) = −C(z) + κB(z). Hence, diminishing returns to scale lead to evolutionary dynamics that are355
qualitatively identical to those arising when economies of scale are absent: for low relatedness, there is356
null provision, and for sufficiently high relatedness, a unique interior attractor appears (see Appendix E.1357
and Fig. 3.c).358
If the production function is accelerating, the indirect gains from switching ek may still be decreasing in359
k because the incremental benefit ∆βk accrues to a smaller number of recipients (n− 1− k) as k increases.360
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In such a scenario, always applicable when n = 2, the evolutionary dynamics are again qualitatively361
identical to those arising when economies of scale are absent. A different picture emerges if n > 2 holds362
and the economies of scale are sufficiently strong. In this case, B(z) can be positive frequency-dependent363
for some z, and hence (for sufficiently high values of κ) so can be G(z). Similarly to the case of club364
goods provision with diminishing returns to scale, this pattern of frequency dependence can give rise to365
bistable coexistence. For a concrete example, consider again the geometric production function (12) with366
λ 6= 1 (see Table 2 for a summary of results, and Appendix E.2 for proofs). In this case, the evolutionary367
dynamics for n > 2 depend on the critical value368
% =
1 + κ(n− 1)
κ(n− 2) , (20)369
and on the two critical cost-to-benefit ratios370
ζ = κ(n− 1), and η = 1
λ− 1
[
1 + λκ
(
(n− 2)λκ
1 + κ(n− 1)
)n−2]
, (21)371
which satisfy % > 1 and ζ < η.372
With these definitions our results can be stated as follows. For λ ≤ % the dynamical outcome depends373
on how the cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β compares to ζ. If γ/β ≥ ζ (high costs), there is null provision, while374
if γ/β < ζ (low costs), there is coexistence. For λ > %, the dynamical outcome also depends on how the375
cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β compares to η. If γ/β ≥ η (high costs), there is null provision. If γ/β ≤ ζ (low376
costs), we have coexistence. In the remaining case (ζ < γ/β < η, intermediate costs) the dynamics are377
characterized by bistable coexistence. Closed form expressions for the singular strategies (z∗ in the case378
of coexistence; zL and zR in the case of bistable coexistence) are not available, but we can find their379
values numerically, as we illustrate in Fig. 3.c and Fig. 3.f.380
It is evident from the dependence of %, ζ, and η on κ that relatedness plays an important role in381
determining the convergence stable level(s) of expression of helping. With higher κ, the regions of the382
parameter space where some z > 0 is convergence stable expand at the expense of the region of dominant383
nonprovision. This is so because ζ and η are increasing functions of κ, and % is a decreasing function of κ.384
Moreover, inside these regions the stable non-zero probability of providing is bigger the higher κ (see Fig.385
3.c and 3.f ). Three cases can be more precisely distinguished as for the effects of increasing κ. First,386
z = 0 can remain stable irrespective of the value of relatedness, which characterizes high cost-to-benefit387
ratios. Second, the system can undergo a transcritical bifurcation, destabilizing z = 0 and leading to the388
appearance of a unique interior attractor (Fig. 3.c). This happens when λ and γ/β are relatively small.389
Third, there is a range of intermediate cost-to-benefit ratios such that, for sufficiently large values of λ,390
the system undergoes a saddle-node bifurcation, whereby two singular strategies appear (Fig. 3.f ). In391
this latter case, economies of scale are strong enough to interact with the kind of good and relatedness in392
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a nontrivial way.393
4.5 Connections with previous models394
Our formalization and analysis of specific collective action problems are connected to a number of results395
in the literature of cooperation and helping; we discuss these connections in the following paragraphs.396
Our results on public goods games with geometric production functions (Section 4.2 and Appendix C)397
extend the model studied in (Hauert et al., 2006, p. 198) from the particular case of interactions between398
unrelated individuals (κ = 0) to the case of related individuals (κ 6= 0) and recover the result in (Archetti,399
2009, p. 476) in the limit λ→ 0, where the game is known as the “volunteer’s dilemma” (Diekmann, 1985).400
Although we restricted our attention to the cases of linear, decelerating, and accelerating production401
functions, it is clear that (15) applies to production functions βj of any shape. Hence, results about402
the stability of equilibria in public goods games with threshold and sigmoid production functions (Bach403
et al., 2006; Pacheco et al., 2009; Archetti and Scheuring, 2011; Pen˜a et al., 2014) carry over to games in404
spatially structured populations.405
Ackermann et al. (2008) considered a model of “self-destructive cooperation”, which can be reinter-406
preted as a charity goods game with no economies of scale in a particular version of the haystack model407
of population structure (Appendix A). In this model we have κ = (n−N)/(n(N − 1)), where N is the408
number of founders and n ≥ N is the number of offspring among which the game is played. Identifying409
our γ and β with (respectively) their β and b, the main result of Ackermann et al. (2008), given by Eq. 7410
in their supplementary material, is recovered as a particular case of our result (13). The fact that in this411
example κ is a probability of coalescence within groups shows that social interactions effectively occur412
between family members, and hence that kin selection is crucial to the understanding of self-destructive413
cooperation (Gardner and Ku¨mmerli 2008; see also Rodrigues and Gardner, 2013).414
Eshel and Motro (1988) consider a model in which one individual in the group needs help, which can415
be provided (action A) or denied (action B) by its n − 1 neighbors: a situation Eshel and Motro call416
the “three brothers’ problem” when n = 3. Suppose that the cost for each helper is a constant ε > 0417
independent on the number of volunteers (the “risk for each volunteer”, denoted by c in Eshel and Motro418
1988) and that the benefit for the individual in need when k co-players offer help is given by vk (the419
“gain function”, denoted by bk in Eshel and Motro 1988). Then, if individuals need help at random,420
the payoffs for helping (A) and not helping (B) are given by ak = −ε(n− 1)/n+ vk/n and bk = vk/n.421
Defining γ = ε(n− 1)/n and βk = vk/(n− 1), we have ak = −γ + βk and bk = βk. Comparing these with422
the payoffs for public goods games in Table 1, it is apparent that the key difference between the case423
considered by Eshel and Motro (1988) and the public goods games considered here is that a provider424
cannot benefit from its own helping behavior. As we show in Appendix F, our results for public goods425
games carry over to such “other-only” goods games (Pepper, 2000). In particular, our results for public426
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goods games with geometric benefits can be used to recover Results 1, 2, and 3 of Eshel and Motro (1988).427
Finally, Van Cleve and Lehmann (2013) discuss an n-player coordination game. They assume payoffs428
given by ak = 1 + S(R/S)
k/(n−1) and bk = 1 + P (T/P )k/(n−1), for positive R,S, T , and P , satisfying429
R > T , P > S and P > T . It is easy to check that both the direct effect −C(z) and the indirect effect430
B(z) are strictly increasing functions of z having exactly one sign change. This implies that, for κ ≥ 0,431
the evolutionary dynamics are characterized by bistability. Importantly, and in contrast to the kinds432
of collective action analyzed in this article, expressing the payoff dominant action A does not always433
qualify as either payoff altruistic or payoff cooperative, as B(z) is negative for some interval z ∈ [0, zˆ).434
As a result, increasing relatedness κ can have mixed effects on the location of the interior convergence435
unstable equilibrium z∗. Both of these predictions are well supported by the numerical results reported436
by Van Cleve and Lehmann (2013), where increasing κ leads to a steady increase in z∗ for R = 2, S = 0.5,437
P = 1.5, T = 0.25, and a steady decrease in z∗ for R = 2, S = 0.5, P = 1.5, T = 1.25 (see their Fig. 5).438
This illustrates the fact that scaled relatedness (and hence spatial structure) plays an important role not439
only in the specific context of collective action problems but also in the more general context of nonlinear440
n-player games.441
5 Discussion442
Many discrete-action, nonlinear n-player games have been proposed to study the evolutionary dynamics of443
collective action in well-mixed populations (Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Dugatkin, 1990; Motro, 1991; Bach444
et al., 2006; Hauert et al., 2006; Pacheco et al., 2009; Archetti and Scheuring, 2011; Pen˜a et al., 2014).445
We extended these models to the more general case of spatially structured populations by integrating446
them into the direct fitness approach of kin selection theory (Taylor and Frank, 1996; Rousset, 2004;447
Lehmann and Rousset, 2010; Van Cleve, 2015). We showed that convergence stable strategies for games448
between relatives are equivalent to those of transformed games between unrelated individuals, where the449
payoffs of the transformed game can be interpreted as “inclusive payoffs” given by the original payoffs to450
self plus scaled relatedness times the sum of original payoffs to others. The evolutionary attractors of451
games in spatially and family structured populations can then be obtained from existing results on games452
in well-mixed populations (Pen˜a et al., 2014).453
We applied these general results to the evolution of collective action under different assumptions on454
the kind of collective good and its economies of scale, thereby unifying and extending previous analyses.455
We considered three kinds of collective goods, illustrative of different kinds of helping traits in nature.456
Firstly, public goods (both providers and shirkers have access to the good) for which the collective action457
problem is the well known free-rider problem (i.e., shirkers are cheaters who benefit from the good without458
helping to create it). Secondly, club goods (only providers have access to the good) for which there is no459
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longer a free-rider but a coordination problem (i.e., individuals might prefer to stay alone rather than join460
a risky collective activity). Thirdly, charity goods (only shirkers use the good) for which the collective461
action problem takes the form of an altruism problem (i.e., individuals would prefer to enjoy the collective462
good rather than provide it for others).463
We showed that relatedness can help solving each of these collective action problems, but that such464
effect takes different forms, depending on the kind of good and on its economies of scale. Simply put:465
relatedness transforms different collective action problems into different games. For public goods this466
transformation does not qualitatively affect the evolutionary dynamics, as it only reduces the cost467
of providing but otherwise leaves economies of scale (and hence patterns of frequency dependence)468
unaffected. Contrastingly, for club goods with diminishing returns and charity goods with increasing469
returns, relatedness can change patterns of frequency dependence in a nontrivial way. In particular,470
increasing relatedness can induce a saddle-node bifurcation resulting in the creation of an attracting471
equilibrium with positive helping and a repelling helping threshold.472
This type of evolutionary dynamics, that we call bistable coexistence, is different from usual scenarios473
of frequency dependence in that selection favors mutants at some intermediate frequencies, but neither474
when rare nor common. Bistable coexistence had been previously predicted in models of public goods475
provision with sigmoidal production functions both in unstructured (Bach et al., 2006; Archetti and476
Scheuring, 2011) and structured (Cornforth et al., 2012) populations. Our results show that bistable477
coexistence can also arise in models of club goods with diminishing returns and of charity goods with478
increasing returns when interactants are related. Participation in cooperative hunting illustrates the first479
of these situations: cooperative hunting is a club good (as hunted prey is available to hunters but not to480
solitary individuals) and is likely to exhibit diminishing returns because hunting success is subadditive481
in the number of hunters (Packer and Ruttan, 1988, Figs. 4-9). Eusociality in insects illustrates the482
second of these situations: eusociality is a charity good (as the benefits of the good created by workers483
are enjoyed only by reproducing queens) and is likely to exhibit increasing returns because of division of484
labor and other factors (Pamilo, 1991; Fromhage and Kokko, 2011). Our results suggest that bistable485
coexistence might be more common than previously considered, thus expanding the repertoire of types of486
frequency-dependence selection beyond classic paradigms of either stabilizing (negative) or disruptive487
(positive) frequency-dependent selection (Levin et al., 1988).488
Our results have implications for theoretical and empirical work on microbial cooperation. Although489
most research in this area has focused on public goods dilemmas (Griffin et al., 2004; Gore et al., 2009;490
Cordero et al., 2012), club and charity goods can also be present in microbial interactions. First, cases491
of “altruistic sacrifice” (West et al., 2006), “self-destructive cooperation” (Ackermann et al., 2008), and492
“bacterial charity work” (Lee et al., 2010), by which providers release chemical substances that benefit493
shirkers, are clear examples of charity goods. Second, “greenbeards” (Gardner and West, 2010; Queller,494
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2011), where providers produce an excludable good such as adherence or food sources (Smukalla et al.,495
2008; White and Winans, 2007), can be taken as examples of club goods. In all these examples, economies496
of scale are likely to be present, and hence also the scope for the complex interaction between relatedness497
and the shape of the production function predicted by our model. In particular, the possibility of bistable498
coexistence has to be acknowledged and taken into account both in models and experiments. Under499
bistable coexistence, even if providers are less fit than shirkers both when rare and when common, they500
are fitter than shirkers for some intermediate frequencies. Consequently, competition experiments should501
test for different starting frequencies before ruling out the possibility of polymorphic equilibria where502
providers and shirkers coexist. More generally, we encourage empirical work explicitly aimed at identifying503
club and charity goods and at measuring occurrences of economies of scale (i.e., nonlinear payoffs) in504
microbial systems.505
We assumed that the actions implemented by players are discrete. This is in contrast to standard506
models of games between relatives, which assume a continuum of pure actions in the form of continuous507
amounts of effort devoted to some social activity. Such continuous-action models have the advantage that508
fitness or payoff functions (the counterparts to (3)) can be assumed to take simple forms that facilitate509
mathematical analysis. On the other hand, there are situations where individuals can express only few510
morphs (e.g., worker and queen in the eusocial Hymenoptera; Wheeler 1986), behavioral tactics (e.g.,511
“producers” and “scroungers” in Passer domesticus; Barnard and Sibly 1981) or phenotypic states (e.g.,512
capsulated and non-capsulated cells in Pseudomonas fluorescens; Beaumont et al. 2009). These situations513
are more conveniently handled by means of a discrete-action model like the one presented here. This514
being said, we expect our qualitative results about the interaction between kind of good, economies of515
scale, and relatedness to carry over to continuous-action models.516
We assumed that the number of interacting individuals n is constant. However, changes in density517
will inevitably lead to fluctuating group sizes, with low densities resulting in small group sizes and high518
densities resulting in large group sizes. It is clear from the dependence of the critical cost-to-benefit ratios519
and the critical returns-to-scale parameters on group size (Table 2) that the effects of varying group sizes520
on the evolutionary dynamics of collective action will critically depend on the the kind of good and its521
economies of scale. It would be interesting to integrate this phenomenon into our model, thus extending522
previous work on the effects of group size in the evolution of helping (Motro, 1991; Bra¨nnstro¨m et al.,523
2011; Pen˜a, 2012; Shen et al., 2014).524
We assumed that players play mixed strategies and that the phenotypic deviation δ is small (i.e.,525
“δ-weak” selection; Wild and Traulsen 2007), which is sufficient to characterize convergence stability but526
insufficient to characterize the fixation probability of a mutant when mutations have strong effects on527
phenotypes. This last scenario may occur when individuals can only express either full provision or null528
provision so that, say, mutants always play A and residents always play B. In these cases, a different529
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limit of weak selection (i.e., “w-weak” selection; Wild and Traulsen 2007) might be more appropriate530
to model the evolutionary dynamics. For general nonlinear n-player games in structured populations531
the evolutionary dynamics will then depend not only on relatedness but also on higher-order genetic532
interactions (Ohtsuki, 2014). The analysis of such evolutionary games under strong mutation effects and533
possibly strong selection remains to be done. This could be partly carried out by using invasion fitness534
proxies such as the basic reproductive number for subdivided populations (Metz and Gyllenberg, 2001;535
Ajar, 2003).536
Collective action problems in nature are likely to be more diverse than the usually assumed model of537
public goods provision with constant returns to scale. Given the local demographic structure of biological538
populations, interactions between relatives are also likely to be the rule rather than the exception.539
Empirical work on the evolution of altruism and cooperation should thus aim at measuring the relatedness540
of interactants, the kind of good, and the associated economies of scale, as it is the interaction between541
these three factors which will determine the evolutionary dynamics of collective action in real biological542
systems.543
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A The haystack model546
Many models of social evolution (Matessi and Jayakar, 1976; Wilson, 1987; Taylor and Wilson, 1988;547
Fletcher and Zwick, 2004; Ackermann et al., 2008; Powers et al., 2011; Cremer et al., 2012) have assumed548
variants of the haystack model (Maynard Smith, 1964), where several rounds of unregulated reproduction549
occur within groups before a round of complete dispersal. In these cases, as we will see below, the scaled550
relatedness coefficient κ takes the simpler interpretation of the coalescence probability of the gene lineage551
of two interacting individuals in their group. Here we calculate κ for different variants of the haystack552
model.553
The haystack model can be seen as a special case of the island model where dispersal is complete and554
where dispersing progeny compete globally. In this context, the fecundity of an adult individual is the555
number of its offspring reaching the stage of global density-dependent competition. The conception of556
offspring may occur in a single or over multiple rounds of reproduction, so that a growth phase within557
patches is possible. We let N denote the number of founders (or lineages, or seeds) on a patch.558
Two cases need to be distinguished when it comes to social interactions. First, the game can be played559
between the founders. In this case560
κ = 0, (A.1)561
since relatedness is zero among founders on a patch and there is no local competition. Second, the game562
can be played between offspring after reproduction and right before their dispersal. In this case two563
individuals are related if they descend from the same founder. Since there is no local competition, κ is564
directly the relatedness between two interacting offspring and is obtained as the probability that the565
two ancestral lineages of two randomly sampled offspring coalesce in the same founder. (Relatedness in566
the island model is defined as the cumulative coalescence probability over several generations, see e.g.,567
Rousset 2004, but owing to complete dispersal gene lineages can only coalesce in founders.)568
In order to evaluate κ for the second case, we assume that, after growth, exactly No offspring are569
produced and that the game is played between them (n = No). Founders, however, may contribute a570
variable number of offspring. Let us denote by Oi the random number of offspring descending from the571
founder i = 1, 2, ..., N on a representative patch after reproduction, i.e., Oi is the size of lineage i. Owing572
to our assumption that the total number of offspring is fixed, we have No = O1 +O2 + ...+ON , where573
the Oi’s are exchangeable random variables. The coalescence probability κ can then be computed as the574
expectation of the ratio of the total number of ways of sampling two offspring from the same founding575
parent to the total number of ways of sampling two offspring:576
κ = E
[
N∑
i=1
Oi(Oi − 1)
No(No − 1)
]
= N
(
σ2 + µ2 − µ
No(No − 1)
)
, (A.2)577
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where the second equality follows from exchangeability, µ = E [Oi] is the expected number of offspring578
descending from any founder i, and σ2 = E
[
(Oi − µ)2
]
is the corresponding variance. Due to the fact579
that the total number of offspring is fixed, we also necessarily have µ = No/N (i.e., No = E [No] =580
E [O1 +O2 + ...+ON ] = Nµ), whereby581
κ =
No −N
N(No − 1) +
σ2N
No(No − 1) , (A.3)582
which holds for any neutral growth process.583
We now consider three different cases:584
1. Suppose that there is no variation in offspring production between founders, as in the life cycle585
described by Ackermann et al. (2008). Then σ2 = 0, and (A.3) simplifies to586
κ =
No −N
N(No − 1) . (A.4)587
2. Suppose that each of the No offspring has an equal chance of descending from any founder, so588
that each offspring is the result of a sampling event (with replacement) from a parent among the589
N founders. Then, the offspring number distribution is binomial with parameters No and 1/N ,590
whereby σ2 = (1− 1/N)No/N . Substituting into (A.3) we get591
κ =
1
N
. (A.5)592
In more biological terms, this corresponds to a situation where individuals produce offspring593
according to a Poisson process and where exactly No individuals are kept for social interactions594
(i.e., the conditional branching process of population genetics; Ewens 2004).595
3. Suppose that the offspring distribution follows a beta-binomial distribution, with number of trials596
No and shape parameters α > 0 and β = α(N − 1). Then, µ = No/N and597
σ2 =
No(N − 1)(αN +No)
N2(1 + αN)
,598
which yields599
κ =
1 + α
1 + αN
. (A.6)600
In more biological terms, this reproductive scheme results from a situation where individuals produce601
offspring according to a negative binomial distribution (larger variance than Poisson, which is602
recovered when α→∞), and where exactly No individuals are kept for social interactions.603
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B Gains from switching and the gain function604
In the following we establish the expressions for −C(z) and B(z) given in (9); the expression for G(z) (10)605
is then immediate from the definition of fk (8) and the identity G(z) = −C(z) + κB(z).606
Recalling the definitions of C(z) and B(z) from (4) as well as the definitions of dk and ek from (6)–(7)607
we need to show608
∂pi(z•, z◦)
∂z•
∣∣∣∣
z•=z◦=z
=
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
zk(1− z)n−1−k [ak − bk] , (B.1)609
∂pi(z•, z◦)
∂z◦
∣∣∣∣
z•=z◦=z
=
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
zk(1− z)n−1−k [k∆ak−1 + (n− 1− k)∆bk] , (B.2)610
611
where the function pi has been defined in (3). (B.1) follows directly by taking the partial derivative of pi612
with respect to z• and evaluating at z• = z◦ = z, so it remains to establish (B.2).613
Our derivation of (B.2) uses properties of polynomials in Bernstein form. Such polynomials, which in614
general can be written as
∑m
k=0
(
m
k
)
xk(1− x)m−kck for x ∈ [0, 1], satisfy (Farouki, 2012, p. 391)615
d
dx
m∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
xk(1− x)m−kck = m
m−1∑
k=0
(
m− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)m−1−k∆ck.616
Applying this property to (3) and evaluating the resulting partial derivative at z• = z◦ = z, yields617
∂pi(z•, z◦)
∂z◦
∣∣∣∣∣
z•=z◦=z
= (n− 1)z
n−2∑
k=0
(
n− 2
k
)
zk(1− z)n−2−k∆ak618
+ (n− 1)(1− z)
n−2∑
k=0
(
n− 2
k
)
zk(1− z)n−2−k∆bk. (B.3)619
620
In order to obtain (B.2) from (B.3) it then suffices to establish621
x
m−1∑
k=0
(
m− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)m−1−kck =
m∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
xk(1− x)m−k kck−1
m
(B.4)622
and623
(1− x)
m−1∑
k=0
(
m− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)m−1−kck =
m∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
xk(1− x)m−k (m− k)ck
m
, (B.5)624
as applying these identities to the terms on the right side of (B.3) yields the right side of (B.2).625
Let us prove (B.4) ((B.5) is proven in a similar way). Starting from the left side of (B.4), we multiply626
and divide by m/(k + 1) and distribute x to obtain627
x
m−1∑
k=0
(
m− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)m−1−kck =
m−1∑
k=0
m
k + 1
(
m− 1
k
)
xk+1(1− x)m−(k+1)ck k + 1
m
.628
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Applying the identity
(
r
k
)
= rk
(
r−1
k−1
)
and changing the index of summation to k = k + 1, we get629
x
m−1∑
k=0
(
m− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)m−1−kck =
m∑
k=1
(
m
k
)
xk(1− x)m−k kck−1
m
.630
Finally, changing the lower index of the sum by noting that the summand is zero when k = 0 gives (B.4).631
C Public goods games with geometric production function632
For a geometric production function, we have ∆βk = βλ
k, so that the inclusive gains from switching for633
public goods games are given by fk = −γ + [1 + κ(n− 1)]βλk. Substituting this expression into (10) and634
using the formula for the probability generating function of a binomial random variable, we obtain635
G(z) = −γ + [1 + κ(n− 1)]β (1− z + λz)n−1 . (C.1)636
As G(z) is either decreasing (λ < 1) or increasing (λ > 1) in z, A (resp. B) is a dominant strategy if637
and only if min [G(0),G(1)] ≥ 0 (resp. if and only if max [G(0),G(1)] ≤ 0). Using (C.1) to calculate G(0)638
and G(1) then yields the critical cost-to-benefit ratios ε = min [G(0),G(1)] and ϑ = max [G(0),G(1)] given639
in (16). The value of z∗ given in (17) is obtained by solving G(z∗) = 0.640
D Club goods games641
For club goods games, the inclusive gains from switching are given by642
fk = −γ + βk+1 + κk∆βk. (D.1)643
D.1 Accelerating production function644
In the case where the production function is accelerating, we have the following general result.645
Result 1 (Club goods games with accelerating production function). Let fk be given by (D.1) with βk646
and ∆βk increasing in k. Moreover, let κ ≥ 0. Then647
1. If γ ≤ β1, z = 1 is the only convergence stable strategy (full provision).648
2. If β1 < γ < βn + κ(n− 1)∆βn−1, both z = 0 and z = 1 are convergence stable and there is a unique649
convergence unstable strategy z∗ ∈ (0, 1) (bistability).650
3. If γ ≥ βn + κ(n− 1)∆βn−1, z = 0 is the only convergence stable strategy (null provision).651
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The assumptions in the statement of the result imply that fk is increasing in k. In particular, we have652
f0 < fn−1. The sign pattern of the inclusive gain sequence thus depends on the values of its endpoints in653
the following way. If f0 ≥ 0 (which holds if and only if γ ≤ β1), fk has no sign changes and a positive654
initial sign. If fn−1 ≤ 0 (which holds if and only if γ ≥ βn + κ(n− 1)∆βn−1), fk has no sign changes and655
a negative initial sign. If f0 < 0 < fn−1 (which holds if and only if β1 < γ < βn + κ(n− 1)∆βn−1) fk has656
one sign change and a negative initial sign. Result 1 follows from these observations upon applying Pen˜a657
et al. 2014, Result 3.658
D.2 Geometric production function659
For a geometric production function, we obtain the following result.660
Result 2 (Club goods games with geometric production function). Let fk be given by (D.1) with βk661
given by (12). Also, let κ ≥ 0 and n > 2 (the cases κ < 0 or n = 2 are trivial). Moreover, let ξ, ς and τ662
be defined by (18) and (19). Then663
1. If λ ≥ ξ, G(z) is nondecreasing in z. Furthermore664
(a) If γ/β ≤ 1, z = 1 is the only convergence stable strategy (full provision).665
(b) If 1 < γ/β < ς, both z = 0 and z = 1 are convergence stable and there is a unique convergence666
unstable strategy z∗ ∈ (0, 1) (bistability).667
(c) If γ/β ≥ ς, z = 0 is the only convergence stable strategy (null provision).668
2. If λ < ξ, G(z) is unimodal in z, with mode given by zˆ = 1+κ[1+κ(n−1)](1−λ) . Furthermore669
(a) If γ/β ≤ 1, z = 1 is the only convergence stable strategy (full provision).670
(b) If 1 < γ/β ≤ ς, both z = 0 and z = 1 are convergence stable and there is a unique convergence671
unstable strategy z∗ ∈ (0, zˆ) (bistability).672
(c) If ς < γ/β < τ , there are two singular strategies zL and zR satisfying 0 < zL < zˆ < zR < 1.673
The strategies z = 0 and zR are convergence stable, whereas zL and z = 1 are convergence674
unstable (bistable coexistence).675
(d) If γ/β ≥ τ , z = 0 is the only convergence stable strategy (null provision).676
Observing that ξ < 1 holds and ignoring the trivial case λ = 1, there are three cases to consider: (i)677
λ > 1, (ii) 1 > λ ≥ ξ, and (iii) ξ > λ.678
For λ > 1 the production function is accelerating and hence Result 1 applies with β1 = β and679
βn + κ(n− 1)∆βn−1 = βς. This yields Result 2.1 for the case λ > 1.680
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To obtain the results for the remaining two cases, we calculate the first and second forward differences681
of the production function (12) and substitute them into682
∆fk = ∆βk+1 + κ
{
(k + 1)∆2βk + ∆βk
}
, k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 2,683
to obtain684
∆fk = βλ
k [λ(1 + κ) + κ(λ− 1)k] , k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 2.685
For λ < 1, the sequence ∆fk is decreasing in k and hence can have at most one sign change. Moreover,686
as ∆f0 = βλ(1 + κ) > 0 always holds true, the initial sign of ∆fk is positive and whether or not the687
sequence ∆fk has a sign change depends solely on how ∆fn−2 compares to zero. Observe, too, that for688
λ < 1 we have ς > 1 as λn < λ holds.689
Consider the case ξ ≤ λ < 1. By the definition of ξ (18) this implies ∆fn−2 ≥ 0. In this case ∆fk690
has no sign changes and fk is nondecreasing. The sign pattern of the inclusive gain sequence can then691
be determined by looking at how the signs of its endpoints depend on the cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β. If692
γ/β ≤ 1, then f0 ≥ 0, implying that fk has no sign changes and its initial sign is positive. If γ/β ≥ ς,693
then fn−1 ≤ 0 and hence fk has no sign changes and its initial sign is negative. If 1 < γ/β < ς, then694
f0 < 0 < fn−1, i.e., fk has one sign change and its initial sign is negative. Result 2.1 then follows from695
an application of Pen˜a et al. 2014, Result 3.696
For λ < ξ we have ∆fn−2 < 0, implying that ∆fk has one sign change from + to −, i.e., fk is697
unimodal. Hence, the gain function G(z) is also unimodal (Pen˜a et al., 2014, Section 3.4.3) with mode zˆ698
determined by G′(zˆ) = 0. Using the assumption of geometric benefits, we can express G(z) is closed form699
as700
G(z) = −γ + β
1− λ + βλ
{
[1 + κ(n− 1)] z − 1
1− λ
}
(1− z + λz)n−2,701
with corresponding derivative702
G′(z) = (n− 1)βλ {1 + κ− (1− λ) [1 + κ(n− 1)] z} (1− z + λz)n−3.703
Solving G′(zˆ) = 0 then yields zˆ as given in Result 2.2. The corresponding maximal value of the gain704
function is705
G(zˆ) = −γ + β
1− λ
[
1 + λκ
(
(n− 2)κ
1 + κ(n− 1)
)n−2]
.706
Result 2.2 then follows from applying Pen˜a et al. 2014, Result 5. In particular, if γ/β ≤ 1, we also have707
26
.CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licensenot peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/012229doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Dec. 4, 2014; 
γ/β < ς, ensuring that f0 ≥ 0 and fn−1 > 0 hold (with unimodality then implying that the gain function708
is positive throughout). If 1 < γ/β ≤ ς, we have f0 < 0 and fn−1 ≥ 0 (with unimodality then implying709
G(zˆ) > 0). If ς < γ/β, we have f0 < 0 and fn−1 < 0. Upon noticing that G(zˆ) ≤ 0 is satisfied if and only710
if γ/β ≥ τ holds, this yields the final two cases in Result 2.2.711
E Charity goods games712
For charity goods games, the inclusive gains from switching are given by713
fk = −γ − βk + κ(n− 1− k)∆βk. (E.1)714
E.1 Decelerating production function715
If the production function is decelerating, we have the following general result.716
Result 3 (Charity goods games with decelerating production function). Let fk be given by (E.1) with717
β0 = 0, βk increasing and ∆βk decreasing in k. Moreover, let κ ≥ 0 (the case κ < 0 is trivial). Then718
1. If γ ≥ κ(n− 1)∆β0, z = 0 is the only convergence stable strategy (null provision).719
2. If γ < κ(n−1)∆β0, both z = 0 and z = 1 are convergence unstable and there is a unique convergence720
stable strategy z∗ ∈ (0, 1) (coexistence).721
The arguments used for deriving this result are analogous to those used for deriving the results for722
the case of club goods with accelerating production function (Result 1 in Appendix D). The assumptions723
in the statement imply that fk is decreasing in k. In particular, we have fn−1 < f0. Consequently, if724
f0 ≤ 0 (which holds if and only if γ ≥ κ(n− 1)∆β0) the inclusive gain sequence has no sign changes and725
its initial sign is negative. Observing that fn−1 = −γ − βn−1 < 0 always holds true, the inequality f0 > 0726
(which holds if and only if γ < κ(n− 1)∆β0) implies that the decreasing sequence fk has one sign change727
and that its initial sign is positive. Result 3 is then obtained by an application of Pen˜a et al. 2014, Result728
3.729
E.2 Geometric production function730
For a geometric production function, we obtain the following result.731
Result 4 (Charity goods games with geometric production function). Let fk be given by (E.1) with βk732
given by (12) and let κ ≥ 0 and n > 2 (the cases κ < 0 or n = 2 are trivial). Moreover, let %, ζ and η be733
defined by (20) and (21). Then734
1. If λ ≤ %, G(z) is nonincreasing in z. Furthermore:735
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(a) If γ/β < ζ, both z = 0 and z = 1 are convergence unstable and there is a unique convergence736
stable strategy z∗ ∈ (0, 1) (coexistence).737
(b) If γ/β ≥ ζ, z = 0 is the only convergence stable strategy (null provision).738
2. If λ > %, G(z) is unimodal in z with mode given by zˆ = κ[(n−2)λ−(n−1)]−1[1+κ(n−1)](λ−1) . Furthermore:739
(a) If γ/β ≤ ζ, both z = 0 and z = 1 are convergence unstable and there is a unique convergence740
stable strategy zˆ < z∗ < 1 (coexistence).741
(b) If ζ < γ/β < η, there are two singular strategies zL and zR satisfying 0 < zL < zˆ < zR < 1.742
The strategies z = 0 and zR are convergence stable, whereas zL and z = 1 are convergence743
unstable (bistable coexistence).744
(c) If γ/β ≥ η, then z = 0 is the only convergence stable strategy (null provision).745
The arguments used for deriving this result are analogous to those used for deriving the results for746
club goods games with geometric production function (Result 2 in Appendix D). Observing that % > 1747
holds for κ ≥ 0 and that the case λ = 1 (constant returns to scale) is trivial, we can prove this result by748
considering three cases: (i) λ < 1, (ii) 1 < λ ≤ %, and (iii) % < λ.749
For λ < 1, the production function is decelerating and hence Result 3 applies with ∆β0 = β. Recalling750
the definition of ζ = κ(n− 1) from (21) and rearranging, this yields Result 4.1 for the case λ ≤ 1 < %.751
To obtain the result for the remaining two cases, we calculate the first and second forward differences752
of the benefit sequence (12) and substitute them into753
∆fk = −(1 + κ)∆βk + κ(n− 2− k)∆2βk, k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 2.754
to obtain755
∆fk = βλ
k {κ [(n− 2)λ− (n− 1)]− 1 + κ(1− λ)k} , k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 2.756
For λ > 1, the sequence ∆fk is decreasing in k and hence can have at most one sign change. Moreover,757
since ∆fn−2 = −βλn−2(1 + κ) < 0 always holds true, the sign pattern of ∆fk depends exclusively on758
how ∆f0 = β {κ [(n− 2)λ− (n− 1)]− 1} compares to zero. Observe, too, that fn−1 < 0 always holds759
true and that the sign of f0 is identical to the sign of ζ − γ/β.760
Consider the case 1 < λ ≤ %. Recalling the definition of % (20) we then have ∆f0 ≤ 0, implying that761
∆fk has no sign changes and that its initial sign is negative, i.e., fk is nonincreasing. Hence, if f0 ≤ 0762
(which holds if and only if γ/β ≥ ζ), the inclusive gain sequence has no sign changes and its initial sign is763
negative. Otherwise, that is, if γ/β < ζ holds, we have f0 > 0 > fn−1 so that the inclusive gain sequence764
has one sign change and its initial sign is positive. Result 4.1 then follows from Pen˜a et al. 2014, Result 3.765
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For λ > % we have ∆f0 > 0, implying that ∆fk has one sign change from + to −, i.e., fk is unimodal.766
This implies that the gain function G(z) is also unimodal with its mode zˆ being determined by G′(zˆ) = 0767
(Pen˜a et al., 2014, Section 3.4.3). Using the assumption of geometric benefits, we can express G(z) in768
closed form as769
G(z) = −γ + β
λ− 1 + β
{
κ(n− 1)− 1
λ− 1 − [1 + κ(n− 1)] z
}
(1− z + λz)n−2770
with corresponding derivative771
G′(z) = (n− 1)β(λ− 1) (1− z + λz)n−3
{
κ(n− 2)− 1 + κ
λ− 1 − [1 + κ(n− 1)] z
}
.772
Solving G′(zˆ) = 0 then yields zˆ as given in Result 4.2. The corresponding maximal value of the gain773
function is774
G(zˆ) = −γ + β
λ− 1
[
1 + κλ
(
(n− 2)κλ
1 + κ(n− 1)
)n−2]
.775
Result 4.2 follows from an application of Pen˜a et al. 2014, Result 5 upon noticing that f0 ≥ 0 (precluding776
the stability of z = 0 and ensuring G(zˆ) > 0) holds if and only if γ/β ≤ ζ and that G(zˆ) ≤ 0 (ensuring777
that B dominates A) is satisfied if and only if γ/β ≥ η. (We note that the range of cost-to-benefit ratios778
γ/β for which bistable coexistence occurs is nonempty, that is η > ζ holds. Otherwise there would exist779
a ratio γ/β satisfying both γ/β ≤ ζ and γ/β ≥ η which in light of Result 4.2.(a) and Result 4.2.(c) is780
impossible.)781
F Other-only goods games782
In other-only goods games, providers are automatically excluded from the consumption of the good they783
create, although they can still reap the benefits of goods created by other providers in their group. Payoffs784
for such games are given by ak = −γ + βk and bk = βk, so that the inclusive gains from switching are785
given by fk = −γ + κ [k∆βk−1 + (n− 1− k)∆βk].786
For this payoff constellation, it is straightforward to obtain the indirect benefits B(z) from (B.3) in787
Appendix B. Indeed, observing that ∆ak = ∆bk = ∆βk holds for all k, we have788
B(z) = ∂pi(z•, z◦)
∂z◦
∣∣∣∣∣
z•=z◦=z
=
n−2∑
k=0
(
n− 2
k
)
zk(1− z)n−2−k(n− 1)∆βk.789
Using (9a) and the fact that ak − bk = −γ, we have that the direct benefit is given by −C(z) = −γ.790
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Substituting these expressions for C(z) and B(z) into (4), we obtain791
G(z) =
n−2∑
k=0
(
n− 2
k
)
zk(1− z)n−2−k [−γ + κ(n− 1)∆βk] . (F.1)792
If κ ≤ 0, our assumption that the production function βk is increasing implies that G(z) is always793
negative, so that z = 0 is the only convergence stable strategy (null provision).794
To analyze the case where κ ≥ 0, it is convenient to observe that (F.1) is of a similar form as (14).795
The only differences are that the summation in (F.1) extends from 0 to n− 2 (rather than to n− 1) and796
that the term multiplying the incremental benefit ∆βk is given by κ(n− 1) (rather than by 1 + κ(n− 1)).797
All the results obtained for public goods games can thus be easily translated to the case of other-only798
goods games.799
Specifically, we have the following characterization of the resulting evolutionary dynamics. With800
constant returns to scale, selection is frequency-independent with null provision if κ < γ/[(n− 1)β] and801
full provision if κ > γ/[(n − 1)β]. With diminishing returns to scale, the gain function is decreasing802
in z (negative frequency dependence). There is null provision if γ ≥ κ(n− 1)∆β0, and full provision if803
γ ≤ κ(n− 1)∆βn−2. If κ(n− 1)∆βn−2 < γ < κ(n− 1)∆β0 holds, there is coexistence. With increasing804
returns to scale, the gain function is increasing in z (positive frequency dependence). There is null provision805
if γ ≥ κ(n− 1)∆βn−2, and full provision if γ ≤ κ(n− 1)∆β0. If κ(n− 1)∆β0 < γ < κ(n− 1)∆βn−2, there806
is bistability.807
If the production function is geometric (12), the gain function is given by808
G(z) = −γ + κ(n− 1)β(1− z + λz)n−2,809
so that, for λ 6= 1, the evolutionary dynamics are similar to the case of public goods games after redefining810
the critical cost-to-benefit ratios as811
ε = min
(
κ(n− 1), λn−2κ(n− 1)) and ϑ = max (κ(n− 1), λn−2κ(n− 1))812
and letting813
z∗ =
1
1− λ
[
1−
(
γ
βκ(n− 1)
) 1
n−2
]
.814
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Figure 1: Three kinds of collective goods. Providers (A) and shirkers (B) interact socially. Providers
(e.g., vigilants, cooperative hunters, or sterile workers) work together to create a collective good (e.g.,
alarm calls, increased hunting success, or nest defense), which can be used exclusively by a subset of
individuals in the group (filled circles). Shirkers do not make any effort in collective action. a, Public
goods (both providers and shirkers use the good). b, Club goods (only providers use the good). c, Charity
goods (only shirkers use the good).
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Figure 2: Linear, decelerating and accelerating production functions (here, geometric production functions
as given by (12) with different values for the returns-to-scale parameter λ). Left panel, benefits βj from the
collective good are additive for linear functions, subadditive for decelerating functions and superadditive
for accelerating functions. Right panel, incremental benefits ∆βj from the collective good are constant for
linear functions (constant returns to scale), decreasing for decelerating functions (diminishing returns to
scale), and increasing for accelerating functions (increasing returns to scale).
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Figure 3: Bifurcation plots illustrating the evolutionary dynamics of collective action for public (a, d),
club (b, e), and charity (c, f ) goods with geometric production function. The scaled relatedness coefficient
κ ≥ 0 serves as a control parameter. Arrows indicate the direction of evolution for the probability of
providing. Solid lines stand for convergence stable equilibria; dashed lines for convergence unstable
equilibria. a, b, c, Diminishing returns to scale (λ = 0.7) and low cost-to-benefit ratio (γ/β = 3.5). d, e,
f, Increasing returns to scale (λ = 1.25) and high cost-to-benefit ratio (γ/β = 15). In all plots, n = 20.
The central arrows, for which κ = 0.5, could correspond, for example, to a group splitting model with
infinitely many groups (g →∞) and splitting probability equal to the migration rate q = m (5), or to a
particular case of the haystack model with two founders (A.5).
39
.CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licensenot peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/012229doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Dec. 4, 2014; 
kind of good payoffs to A
(ak)
payoffs to B
(bk)
direct gains
(dk)
indirect gains
(ek)
inclusive gains
(fk)
public −γ + βk+1 βk −γ+∆βk (n−1)∆βk −γ+(1 + κ(n−1))∆βk
club −γ + βk+1 0 −γ+βk+1 k∆βk −γ+βk+1+κk∆βk
charity −γ βk −γ−βk (n−1−k)∆βk −γ−βk+κ(n−1−k)∆βk
Table 1: Payoff structures and gains from switching for the three classes of collective action problems. In
each case providers incur a cost γ > 0 to create a collective good of value βj ≥ 0, where j is the number
of providers in the group. The number of providers experienced by a focal is j = k if the focal is a shirker
(action B), and j = k + 1 if it is a provider (action A). Direct gains (dk) and indirect gains (ek) are
calculated by substituting the formulas for ak and bk into (6) and (7). Inclusive gains from switching (fk)
are then obtained from (8).
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public goods
λ < 1 λ > 1
γ/β ≤ ε full provision γ/β ≤ ε full provision
ε < γ/β < ϑ coexistence ε < γ/β < ϑ bistability
γ/β ≥ ϑ null provision γ/β ≥ ϑ null provision
club goods
λ < 1/% λ ≥ 1/%
γ/β ≤ 1 full provision γ/β ≤ 1 full provision
1 < γ/β < ς bistability 1 < γ/β < ς bistability
ς ≤ γ/β < τ bistable coexistence
γ/β ≥ ς null provision
γ/β ≥ τ null provision
charity goods
λ ≤ % λ > %
γ/β < ζ coexistence γ/β < ζ coexistence
γ/β ≥ ζ null provision ζ ≤ γ/β < η bistable coexistence
γ/β ≥ η null provision
Table 2: Dynamical regimes of collective action for the case of geometric production functions. The
dynamical outcome depends on the type of good, the magnitude of the returns-to-scale parame-
ter λ, and the cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β. The results hold for κ ≥ 0 and n > 2. The criti-
cal cost-to-benefit ratios are given by ζ = κ(n − 1), ε = min(1 + ζ, λn−1(1 + ζ)), ϑ = max(1 +
ζ, λn−1(1 + ζ)), η = [1/(λ− 1)]
{
1 + λκ [(n− 2)λκ/(1 + ζ)]n−2
}
, ς = (1 − λn)/(1 − λ) + ζλn−1,
τ = [1/(1− λ)]
{
1 + λκ [(n− 2)κ/(1 + ζ)]n−2
}
. The critical returns-to-scale parameters are ξ =
κ(n− 2)/[1 + κ(n− 1)] and % = 1/ξ.
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